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THERE’S A LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL. . .
(THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN THE UK)
By Steven Vaughan*
The energy produced by the breaking down of the atom is a
very poor kind of thing. Anyone who expects a source of
power from the transformation of these atoms is
talking moonshine.
Lord Earnest Rutherford (1933)
We have come a long way in a little over seventy years. On 23 May
2007, the Government of the United Kingdom published an Energy
White Paper (‘Meeting the Energy Challenge’) in which a tentative green
light was given for the development of nuclear new builds, it being . . .the
Government’s preliminary view. . . that it is in the public interest to give the private
sector the option of investing in new nuclear power stations.1 This article will set
the background to 2007 Energy White Paper and detail a number of the
outstanding matters which need to be progressed before decisions are
made (by the Government and potential promoters) on the future of nu-
clear power in the UK’s energy mix.
THE PATH TO THE “PRELIMINARY VIEW”
The breadcrumb trail to the 2007 Energy White Paper is a long and,
at times, circuitous path.  February 2003 saw the publication of a Govern-
ment Energy White Paper entitled “Our energy future – creating a low
carbon economy.” This Paper endorsed the (at the time) emerging view
that renewables and energy efficiency could play a central role in the
UK’s future energy policy. On the subject of nuclear power generation,
the White Paper commented that, “Although nuclear power produces no
carbon dioxide, its current economics make new nuclear build an unat-
tractive option. . .We do not, therefore, propose to support new nuclear
build now. But we will keep the option open.”2
In July 2006, the UK Government published ‘The Energy Challenge’
Energy Review which highlighted two overriding challenges in the energy
sector: climate change; and security of energy supply.  Although further
measures were required to promote renewable energy and energy effi-
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1. “Meeting the Energy Challenge,” UK White Paper on Energy, May 2007.
2. “Our Energy Future – Creating a Low Carbon Economy,” UK White Paper on
Energy, February 2003.
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ciency, the 2006 Energy Review stated that these measures, on their own,
were insufficient to address climate change and security of supply con-
cerns and, as such, nuclear new builds had a “role to play.” This an-
nouncement caused widespread controversy, in part because of the Gov-
ernment’s commitment in the 2003 White Paper that, “Before any
decision to proceed with the building of new nuclear power stations,
there would need to be the fullest public consultation.”3 In October
2006, Greenpeace brought judicial review proceedings against the UK
Government alleging that the consultation process leading to the deci-
sion on nuclear power in the 2006 Energy Review was procedurally flawed
and thus unlawful. In February 2007 at the High Court, Mr Justice Sulli-
van held that “the consultation exercise was very seriously flawed” and
accepted the proposition put forward by counsel for Greenpeace that
“something has gone clearly and radically wrong.”4
While embarrassing for the UK Government, the decision in the
Greenpeace case was not one of substance against the promulgation of
nuclear power generation but rather a strong criticism of the processes
leading to the 2006 Energy Review’s conclusion that nuclear new build
has a role to play in the UK’s future energy mix. In a press release follow-
ing the decision, the Department of Trade and Industry commented that
the “judgement is about the process of consultation, not the principle of
nuclear power.” To secure “the fullest public consultation” on the topic
of nuclear power generation, the Department of Trade and Industry pub-
lished, in May 2007, a Consultation Document (‘The Future of Nuclear
Power’) which sits alongside the 2007 Energy White Paper and sets out
the information the Government has reviewed as part of the process of
reaching its “preliminary view” that new nuclear power stations should be
given the green light. The consultation period ends on 10 October 2007.5
KEEPING THE LIGHTS ON
Nuclear power currently provides around eighteen percent of the
UK’s electricity generation and 7.5 percent of total UK energy supplies.
However, most of the existing nuclear power stations are scheduled for
closure over the course of the next fifteen years. Despite legislative mea-
sures and policy initiatives to encourage and improve energy efficiency,
the UK Government estimates that the UK will require around thirty to
thirty-five GW of new electricity generation capacity over the next two
decades (and around two thirds of this capacity by 2020). On a global
view, the International Energy Agency forecasts that between 2004 and
2030, global primary energy demand will rise by fifty-three percent.6 As
3. “Our Energy Future – Creating a Low Carbon Economy,” UK White Paper on
Energy, February 2003.
4. R (on the application of Greenpeace Ltd) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007]
EWHC 311 (Admin).
5. See http://nuclearpower2007.direct.gov.uk.
6. “World Energy Outlook,” International Energy Agency Report, 2006.
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the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee put it, . . .very
substantial investment in new generating capacity and energy efficiency will be
required if the lights are to stay on.7
As detailed above, there are a number of factors relating to the shift
in Government policy from non-committal on the UK’s nuclear future to
“preliminary” support:
• Increasing evidence of climate change, rising carbon emis-
sions and wider recognition (at national and international
levels) of the need for immediate global action coupled with
the general acceptance of nuclear power as a low carbon
source of electricity;
• Increasing reliance in the UK on imported energy, which re-
quires management of, “the risks arising from the concentra-
tion of fossil fuel reserves in fewer and further places, some
of them in less stable parts of the world.”8 Over fifty percent
of proven natural gas reserves are located in three countries
(Russia, Iran and Qatar) and it is expected that by 2020, the
UK will be obliged to import eighty percent of its gas needs.
The European Commission has commented that, “Nuclear
energy generation has a role to play in the response to the
Strategic Energy Review and, in particular, to the main pri-
orities. . . [of] security of supply, competitiveness and sus-
tainability.”9 It is hard to argue against the proposition that
including nuclear power in the UK’s energy mix would in-
crease security of supply through diversity; and
• Interest from the private sector in investing in new nuclear
power stations, due in part to increasing fossil fuel prices
which make the economics of nuclear new build more attrac-
tive. Nuclear plants are largely insensitive to changes in the
cost of fuel and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency reports
that the rising price of uranium has had little impact on nu-
clear electricity costs.10
OUTSTANDING ISSUES
While the case for new nuclear plant in the UK has been clearly
stated, a number of outstanding issues (requiring debate and progress by
Government and investor and NGO stakeholders, as well as the wider UK
populace) remain:
7. “Keeping the Lights On: Nuclear, Renewables and Climate Change,” House of
Commons Environmental Audit Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2005–06.
8. “Meeting the Energy Challenge,” UK White Paper on Energy, May 2007.
9. “Nuclear Illustrative Programme,” Commission Communication COM (2006) 844,
January 2007.
10. “Uranium 2005: Resources, Production and Demand”, OECD Nuclear Energy
Agency and International Atomic Energy Agency Report, May 2006.
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The Regulatory Environment
Under current law, the construction and operation of a new nuclear
station in England and Wales11 requires a number of consents and ap-
provals from different regulatory bodies:
1. A nuclear site licence from the Nuclear Installations Inspec-
torate (part of the Health and Safety Executive);
2. Consents, under sections 36 and 37 of the Electricity Act
1989, from the Secretary of State for the Department of
Trade and Industry (granting licence to operate an electric-
ity-generating power plant with capacity greater than fifty
MW and deemed planning consent). Generally, this in-
cludes a public inquiry where there is a detailed considera-
tion of the proposal and any objections; and
3. Radioactive waste disposal and discharge authorisations
from the Environment Agency.
The application and approval process can last upwards of three
years. Indeed, the Sizewell B planning inquiry (into the building of Brit-
ain’s first pressurised water reactor power station) alone lasted for 340
days and heard evidence from 195 witnesses. The Barker Review con-
cluded that the UK planning system is consistently one of the top six
concerns for investors in the UK.12 A lack of a clear policy framework
(due to different and overlapping development consent regimes) has dis-
couraged promoters from bringing forward proposals for development.
Cognisant of the fact that [t]he process for dealing with major infrastructure
projects, from submission of the proposal to decision in particular, is too slow and
complicated13 the UK Government published, on 21 May 2007, a White
Paper entitled, ‘Planning for a Sustainable Future’ which sets out wide
ranging reforms. A detailed review of the proposals is outside of the con-
text of this article, but in brief the Government is proposing that:
1. National policy statements will be introduced for nationally
significant infrastructure projects. These will set out the na-
tional need for the relevant infrastructure and “integrate na-
tional economic, environmental and social goals to deliver
sustainable development.”14 In the energy sector, the 2007
Planning White Paper details that the national policy state-
ment would consider objectives in relation to security of
supply, the UK’s increasing energy demand and the aim of
reducing carbon emissions. In the 2007 Nuclear Consulta-
tion Document, the Government comments that streamlin-
ing the nuclear plant consent process “could take the form
of a National Policy Statement.” Indeed, it would be some-
what peculiar were the nuclear sector to be outside of the
11. The power to consent the construction of power stations has been devolved in
Scotland to Scottish Ministers (and is also devolved in Northern Ireland).
12. “Barker Review of Land Use Planning,” Final Report, December 2006.
13. “Planning for a Sustainable Future,” UK White Paper, May 2007.
14. Id.
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remit of the planned revisions to the major infrastructure
development consent regime;
2. Infrastructure project promoters will receive better advice in
the preparation of development applications (requiring
public consultation and earlier engagement with statutory
environmental and heritage bodies);
3. An independent infrastructure planning commission be es-
tablished to take the decisions on nationally significant in-
frastructure cases. The commission would approve any ap-
plication for development consent which had main aims
consistent with the national policy statement unless the local
consequences outweighed the benefits; and
4. The existing development consent regimes be rationalised
and inquiry procedures improved. The infrastructure plan-
ning commission would grant project consents, confer pow-
ers and amend legislation, necessary to implement nation-
ally significant infrastructure projects. The authorisations
conferred by the commission could include deemed plan-
ning permission, compulsory purchase of land, permission
to construct associated infrastructure, hazardous substances
consents and powers to stop up or divert highways.
The aim is that the reforms will reduce the time taken from applica-
tion to decision on major infrastructure projects to under a year in the
majority of cases. However, this estimate does not take into account the
time required in preparing for the application (including stakeholder
consultation, which the May 2007 Planning White Paper calls, “the hall-
mark of good scheme development”). It remains to be seen whether
these proposals will effectively reduce the average time period for a major
infrastructure project development consent application or merely reallo-
cate the global time taken to receive project consent by front-loading the
pre-application stage. It is intended that the independent infrastructure
planning commission would be operational by 2009.
The Low Carbon Economy
The International Energy Agency’s 2006 “World Energy Outlook” es-
timates that by 2030 forty-four percent of global energy related emissions
will derive from power generation. As the Government put it in the 2007
Nuclear Consultation Document, “Growing concern about climate
change has put pressure on the electricity supply industry to adopt tech-
nologies that do not add to the world’s emissions of carbon dioxide.”
While it may be possible to label the operation of a nuclear power
plant as zero-carbon, an holistic approach to evaluating carbon emissions
highlights power plant construction, uranium mining and fabrication,
fuel transportation and waste management as nuclear lifecycle emission
sources. A March 2006 report by the Sustainable Development Commis-
sion (SDC) concluded that, “Our evidence shows that taking into account
the emissions associated with plant construction and the fuel cycle, the
emissions associated with nuclear power production are relatively low,
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with an average value of 4.4tC/GWh, compared to 243tC/GWh for coal
and 97tC/GWh for gas.”15 However, these figures did not include emis-
sions from nuclear decommissioning and waste treatment (which are
more difficult to accurately quantify). Certain other studies have put the
emissions levels somewhat higher, although significantly less than those
for coal and gas.
The SDC acknowledges that overall emissions reductions in the con-
struction of a nuclear power plant could be further achieved by incorpo-
rating construction inputs into emissions trading schemes. They con-
clude that a new nuclear programme could contribute an eight percent
reduction in UK emissions against 1990 levels. Obviously, this is not
enough (in and of itself) to achieve the UK’s emissions reductions target
of sixty percent by 2050 (as detailed in the 2007 Energy White Paper) but
nuclear power is not intended, and should not be regarded, as the pan-
acea cure-all for climate change. It is but one of a variety of interlocking
future options.
Money, Money, Money. . .
At present, there is nothing stopping applications for nuclear new
builds in the UK. Admittedly, the existing regulatory processes are time
consuming and cumbersome, but these are not, in and of themselves,
actual barriers to new development. Instead, it is perhaps fair to say that
the perception of nuclear power generation in the UK has been one of a
particularly high risk investment. The House of Commons Environmental
Audit Committee detailed the high cost of planning applications, the
need to sell electricity generated at a certain minimum price and the
need to cap decommissioning and waste disposal costs as key risk fac-
tors.16 Nuclear power plants require initial high capital investment (with
the European Commission estimating that construction costs for nuclear
plant are two to four times greater than for a combined cycle gas tur-
bine)17 and a subsequent relatively long period (five years, being optimis-
tic) before any such investment starts to show a profit. The question was
once one of whether the rate of return on a new nuclear power station
justified the risk in investment.
In their joint evidence to the House of Commons Environmental Au-
dit Committee, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
and the Department of Trade and Industry commented that:
There is very little evidence on the robustness of cost estimates
for new nuclear build as there is currently only one plant being
built in Europe. [. . .] Past experience of cost overruns in non-
15. “The Role of Nuclear Power in a Low Carbon Economy,” SDC Report, March
2006.
16. “Keeping the Lights On: Nuclear, Renewables and Climate Change,” House of
Commons Environmental Audit Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2005–06.
17. “Nuclear Illustrative Programme,” Commission Communication COM(2006) 844,
January 2007.
\\server05\productn\B\BLE\1-3\BLE306.txt unknown Seq: 7 16-JUL-07 7:43
474 BLOOMBERG EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:468
liberalised electricity markets, however, provides no guide to the
prospects for new nuclear build in a liberalised market.18
With the reforms detailed in the 2007 Planning White Paper (set out
above), it is hoped that a more streamlined regulatory process will in-
crease certainty in the framework of nuclear new builds and lead to de-
creased long-term cost risks. Questions remain on certain of the unique
economic problems relating to the construction of new nuclear plants
but it is ultimately for the individual investor to decide whether a suffi-
ciently profitable rate of return can be achieved and investment in nu-
clear new builds is financially viable.
Concerns have been raised over the possibility of the UK Govern-
ment being required to step into the shoes of a nuclear plant operator
and/or provide financial support in the case of economic difficulties. To
allay this fear, the 2007 Nuclear Consultation Document states that the
Government will develop, “arrangements that would protect the taxpayer
by ensuring that private sector operators of nuclear power stations se-
curely accumulate the funds needed to meet the full costs of decommis-
sioning and full share of waste management costs.” To this end, the UK
Government is planning on enshrining in legislation the financing struc-
ture in relation to new nuclear power stations, “to be satisfied that the
arrangements are sufficiently robust, even in the event of insolvency or
early decommissioning of the power station.”19 It is likely that such legis-
lation will focus on a funding arrangement plan, which will require Gov-
ernment approval prior to plant construction (although it is not clear
how this consent process sits with the proposals in the 2007 Planning
White Paper, which seeks to rationalise development consent procedures
by having a single application to the infrastructure planning commis-
sion). Of the various funding options, the Government has stated a pref-
erence for an approach whereby nuclear site owners/operators are re-
quired to make payments to a separate body, such as a trust, to secure
adequate accumulation of monies in relation to decommissioning and
waste management costs. The 2007 Nuclear Consultation Document
states that nuclear financing legislation would be presented at an “early
opportunity,” although no estimate time frames are given (perhaps as this
could be said to be pre-determining the outcome of the consultation pro-
cess on whether investment in nuclear new builds should be given the
green light).
Waste Disposal
Radioactive waste is one of the most emotive outstanding issues in
the context of nuclear new builds. Though Ronald Reagan once (over-
simplistically) quipped that, “All the waste in a year from a nuclear power
18. Paragraph 27 of Ev269 to the House of Commons Environmental Audit
Committee, Session 2005–06.
19. “The Future of Nuclear Power,” DTI Consultation Document, May 2007.
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plant can be stored under a desk,” it is estimated that the UK has an
historic legacy of nuclear waste that will total 475,000m3, being a complex
mix of wastes from civil and military nuclear programmes. Through the
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority in the UK, the public sector is ulti-
mately responsible for delivering and paying for a long-term waste man-
agement solution as regards historic waste. However, the UK Government
has made it clear that the private sector will pay its “full share” of the costs
of long-term waste management arising from any nuclear new build.
The Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) was
asked by the UK Government in 2003 to make recommendations for the
long-term management of the UK’s higher activity wastes that would both
protect the public and the environment, and inspire public confidence.
In their July 2006 report, CoRWM recommended that geological disposal
by way of deep underground facilities is: the best available approach for the
long-term management of all the material categorised as waste in the CoRWM
inventory when compared with the risks associated with other methods of manage-
ment. The aim should be to progress to disposal as soon as practicable, consistent
with developing and maintaining public and stakeholder confidence.20 CoRWM
placed heavy emphasis on public and stakeholder engagement, which it
believes, “will be essential to build trust and confidence in the proposed
long-term management approach, including siting of facilities.”
CoRWM’s approach to the management of radioactive waste suggests an
iterative process (interim storage followed by geological disposal coupled
with intensive research efforts) with heavy community and regulatory in-
volvement. CoRWM’s remit did not include the implications of additional
waste from nuclear new builds (the volume of which will depend on the
number and nature of proposals for new nuclear power stations), but a
number of its conclusions are nonetheless relevant. Indeed, the UK Gov-
ernment in the 2007 Energy White Paper cited, “significant progress in
tackling the legacy waste issue” as one of the factors which led to its “pre-
liminary view” that nuclear new builds should be given the green light. It
is expected that the UK Government will publish a consultation on the
implementation process for developing a long-term waste management
solution during the summer of 2007.
Public Acceptance
Public perception about nuclear power (in particular, its safety as-
pects) is arguably low. Incidents at Three Mile Island (1979) and
Chernobyl (1986) have led to heightened fears (justified or otherwise)
regarding the social and environmental costs from power station acci-
dents or acts of terrorism directed at nuclear plants. Safety risks lie in the
operation of nuclear power stations, the transport of fuel to the plants
and the storage of radioactive waste. However, the nuclear sector is heav-
ily regulated, nuclear plants have multiple, redundant safety mechanisms
20. “Managing our Radioactive Waste Safely,” CoRWM Doc 700, July 2006.
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and the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee concluded
in 2006 that “At least in the West, the safety record of civil nuclear power
stations has been good.”21 In addition, the SDC commented that: Modern
reactor designs have substantial containment buildings which are unlikely to be
breached even by a crashing commercial airliner and the reactor fuel is protected
against impact and fire by other structures.22
The crux of the problem appears to lie in perceived risks which may
not, as a matter of fact, be sufficiently likely that they justify a blanket ban
on the promulgation of nuclear energy. There is an obvious difficulty in
weighing the likelihood of an incident (intentional or accidental) against
the potential for disaster. Historically, lengthy consultations on nuclear
energy matters (such as Sizewell B) have not given a ‘voice’ to all poten-
tially interested stakeholders (either through lack of resources, lack of
interest due to consultation fatigue or intimidation of an often adver-
sarial system of information gathering). The 2007 Planning White Paper
seeks to bolster public consultation and engagement, making stakeholder
dialogue a recurring and continual process from national policy state-
ment drafting through to an ‘open floor’ stage in planning inquiries.
CONCLUSIONS
The nuclear new build option has become recently more attractive
to investors due to, among other matters, the: (i) rising carbon emissions;
(ii) need to strengthen the UK’s security of supply through a diverse en-
ergy mix; and (iii) fluctuation in fossil fuel prices. However, it is nigh on
impossible to predict how fossil fuel prices (and the price of carbon
under EU, national and later international, emissions trading schemes)
will fluctuate going forward. It is also difficult to assess the rate at which
renewable energy technology will develop and become more cost effi-
cient (and the impact of promoting nuclear power on the renewable en-
ergy sector).
It is perhaps all too easy to focus on the future of nuclear power in
the UK in isolation, as the matter is so politically and culturally charged.
Because of the necessary lead-in times, new nuclear power stations are
not an immediate answer to either the requirement for increased gener-
ating capacity or the pressing need to tackle climate change. In the con-
text of the UK’s energy efficiency and emissions goals, there is no single
solution. New nuclear power stations are not a panacea cure-all, but it is
hoped that they can form part of a multi-headed complex web of mea-
sures necessary to combat climate change and improve security of energy
supply.
21. “Keeping the Lights On: Nuclear, Renewables and Climate Change,” House of
Commons Environmental Audit Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2005–06.
22. “The Role of Nuclear Power in a Low Carbon Economy,” SDC Report, March
2006.
